“The strength of the Finnish soldier lies in individual combat. The Finns possess an infallible instinct for finding their way in the dense growth of the pathless wilds. They are accurate trail readers and move noiselessly in the woods. Nothing is heard or seen of Finnish troops whether resting or marching, even from the closest proximity. Terrain training is of a very high order. A special technique for movement through woods has been developed and practiced so that the troops advance quickly, in the right direction and without losing contact. A Finnish company moves in the primeval forest just as smoothly and unerringly as a German company in the open landscape of central Europe. All Finns are enthusiastic hunters and sport lovers and fighting wakens in them all their hunting instincts. The aggressiveness of the troops is very keen. Their achievements in long-range combat patrolling cannot be surpassed.” —”Warfare In The Far North” (U.S. Army translation of German documents, part of the “German Report Series” produced in 1951.)
Simo Häyhä, one of the most successful snipers of all time, achieved most of his kills using a rifle with standard sights. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
The German army has never been known for its effusive praise of friends or enemies. In that light, the preceding comments offer strong insight into the Germans’ appreciation of Finnish troops in battle. The remarkable performance of Finland’s small military in holding back the Red Army during the Winter War of 1939-1940 drew the attention of many military planners, particularly those with an eye to engage in combat with the Russians in the frozen north. German intelligence took note of Finnish tactics as the Wehrmacht quietly prepared for its ultimate showdown with the USSR.
The ultimate Finnish sniper rifle: The M/39-43 sniper rifle fitted with the German-made 4×38 “Ajack” scope (Finnish nomenclature: M/43 rifle scope). Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
The Red Army learned some very painful lessons during their short campaign in Finland. They, too, anticipated a war with Germany and knew they would need to adopt new tactics and achieve a much higher level of discipline to survive the Nazi threat. In 1990, Mikhail Semiryaga wrote in “The Winter War: Looking Back After Fifty Years:”
“The infantry could not fight on skis, and in this respect, they were inferior to the Finnish troops. Serious problems had developed in army supplies, and the trucking service had proved inadequate. The commanders had insufficient knowledge of the enemy and his organization, armaments and tactics. They knew hardly anything about the dangers of the Mannerheim Line.”
The M/39-43 came into service in early 1944, and remained in storage until the early 1980s. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
“Army Commander 2nd Rank Nikolai Voronov wrote that the Finnish troops had shown a high level of individual tactical skill and marksmanship training. They were fine skiers and snipers, they often used flares to light the terrain and were good at finding their way around. Their camouflage outfits were very well-designed.”
Harvesting Reds In The Snow: Finland’s Legendary Simo Häyhä
On Nov. 30, 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland. By March 7, 1940, more than 500 Red Army soldiers lay dead in the snow, all shot by one man: Simo Häyhä. While Häyhä’s kill count seems almost unbelievable, the reality is that his achievements came from traditional Finnish fieldcraft and the extreme patience of a hunter.
The Finnish M/33 sniper rifle fitted with a Zeiss 4X scope. The M/33 used a special, curved 5-round stripper clip that could be used with the large scope fitted. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
What may come as a surprise to many, is that most of Simo Häyhä’s kills were achieved without the use of a telescopic sight. His competition-grade SAKO M/28-30 rifle (a Finnish-produced version of Mosin–Nagant M1891) was equipped with standard sights. His other firearm was the Suomi KP/-31 9mm submachine gun, also equipped with standard sights. Consequently, most of his shooting was not done at long range. Also, Häyhä preferred iron sights over a scope as he felt it kept his profile lower and eliminated the risk of sunlight reflecting off his optics to betray his position. Additionally, telescopic lenses could easily fog up in the extreme cold. All of these were real possibilities in Häyhä’s war in the Arctic.
Finnish sniper using a M/39 SOV rifle—a Finnish M/39 rifle fitted with a captured Soviet PE rifle scope. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
His M/28-30 rifle was extremely well made, accurate and completely reliable. Meanwhile, the Suomi submachine gun may seem an unlikely arm for the world’s most successful sniper, but the 10.5-lb. SMG was remarkably accurate (even out to 200 meters). There is negligible felt recoil or muzzle climb in short bursts from the KP/-31—one of the most stable SMGs ever made.
Häyhä was a small man, barely 5′, 3″ tall. And while this may have helped disguise him in the carefully prepared positions that he shot from, the extreme cold affected him like everyone else—he just didn’t let it distract him from his job. “I did what I was told, as well as I could.” That statement alone shows that he was prepared for success in extremely difficult circumstances. Certainly, he thrived in a target-rich environment. And when he was asked how he became such a great marksman, his reply was simple: “practice.”
The most common Finnish sniper rifles were captured M/91-30 rifles equipped with a PE scope. Compared to a standard M/91-30 rifle, the Soviet sniper rifles featured better barrels, smoother trigger action and an overall better fit and finish.
On March 7, 1940, Häyhä was hit in the head and suffered disfiguring wounds to the face and jaw. After he had some time to recover, he volunteered for service in the Finnish “Continuation War” against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. However, the Finnish Army denied his application, and the national hero remained at home to quietly work on his farm.
Sniping Goes On In The Continuation War
To regain territory lost to the Soviet invasion in 1939, Finland declared war on the USSR on June 25, 1941. The second Soviet Finnish War, or the “Continuation War”, would continue until Sept. 19, 1944. In that time, the Finns developed a sniper (and counter-sniper) doctrine of their own. This program came from the careful study of Soviet sniper tactics, while the predominate amount of Finnish sniper rifles were captured Soviet M/91-30 and SVT-40 types equipped with Russian optics.
A Finnish sniper team at work. The rifle is a captured Soviet M/91-30 with a PE scope. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
Finland lacked the ability to produce telescopic sights in any quantity and turned to Germany for help in this regard. Unfortunately for the Finns, it took until late 1943 before German scopes were available. In early 1944, the Finnish M/39-43 sniper rifle appeared on the battlefield: a combination of select M/39 rifles fitted with the German-made 4×38 “Ajack” scope (the Finns called this the “M/43 rifle scope”) and attached with Finnish-made mounts. Ultimately, this was finest of the Finnish wartime sniper rifles, and the M/39-43 remained in their arsenals until the 1980s.
Finnish field-craft: A sniper at work in a hollowed out tree stump. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
In December 1943, the U.S. Intelligence publication “Tactical and Technical Trends” published a captured German report titled “Finnish Views on Sniping.” American observers noted that the Germans took the Finns quite seriously on this matter as they fought a common opponent in the Soviet army. I believe that it remains a valid primer on sniping more than 80 years later. The full text of that report is offered below for your review.
Finnish Views On Sniping
The following excerpts from a translated German document give the views of the Finnish general staff on Russian snipers, the general principles of sniping and the defense against sniping. The German translation of the original Finnish document was said to have been widely distributed by the German training command and can therefore, be considered as having been approved by the German high command.
Finnish sniper using a captured Soviet M/91-30 sniper rifle, equipped with the slightly simplified Soviet PEM scope. The PEM (m/1937) scope eliminated the focus adjustment ring. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
a. Russian Training and Activity
This section is a Finnish summary of information derived from Russian sources pertaining to the training and activity of Russian snipers.
(1) General
As to moral and physical strength, the sniper must be a first-class fighter. Only a man utterly unafraid and imbued with the will to do his duty to the last, can measure up to such a task. During the attack his place is 10 to 15 yards behind the firing line; his task to lie in ambush for enemy officers and light and heavy machine gunners. In the defense his place is either on the ground or in a tree, preferably at the limiting points of the frontal sector or the open flanks. His task is the annihilation of enemy commanders and also soldiers about to execute special missions entrusted to them.
In patrol activity the sniper’s place is in the center. When engaged, he withdraws slightly to the rear in order to be able to select his target better. Snipers always work in pairs. One to observe with the binoculars and estimate distances, the other to fire. Their contact is either visual or by prearranged signals. They are supported by riflemen. Their alternative positions there are several of them – are approximately 20 yards away from the firing positions. Of main importance in the selection of the positions are the field of fire and camouflage.
Finnish sniper in Karelia during April 1943. He uses the M/39 PH sniper rifle using the Finnish “Physica” scope, originally intended for use on Maxim M/32 machine guns. The scope suffered from fogging problems as well as a short eye relief (40 mm) that led to many black eyes. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
In order to be able to determine the location and nature of the enemy target by means of a few (very often barely noticeable indications) the sniper must possess a highly-developed sense of vigilance and faculty of observation.
It is claimed that in winter time a sniper discovered an adversary by his breath visible behind a stone or bush, and another behind a tree by some birds that picked up bread crumbs dropped by the soldier on the ground.
Especially in the defense, the sniper must possess patience and tenacity. He often has to watch hours on end for the appearance of an enemy observer in the slit of a pill box or a careless movement that betrays his presence in a trench. The battle with the enemy is a continuous one decided by the one who makes the first careless move or fires the first premature shot.
The independent nature of his activity, the necessity of knowing how to take the best advantage of cover and concealment, and to fit himself into constantly (very often very swiftly) changing conditions make the sniper’s thorough training in tactics a prerequisite.
Additional image of a Finnish M/39 PH sniper rifle. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
He must be able in all situations to make a quick decision as to which of the enemy targets have to be eliminated first. Often he is entirely on his own and fights without contact with his command post.
The sniper must be thoroughly versed in the art of camouflage. Again, the use of firing tables, the calculation of errors, the making of map sketches, presuppose a sufficient amount of schooling and education.
(2) Replacements
Considering the fact that continual fighting often under severe conditions takes a high toll of both mental and physical energy and capacity, special attention must be paid to the proper clothing, feeding and rest of the snipers.
The training of new snipers should be in the hands of the experienced ones and should be conducted on the days when the latter are free from front duty.
(3) Reconnaissance Activity
For reconnaissance, snipers are to be employed solely for their own tasks. They are only to be attached to medium-sized reconnaissance parties and in pairs.
When the reconnaissance party advances, the two snipers follow the main body and observe distant targets. Sometimes it proves advantageous to use the snipers as a connecting link between patrols, committing them in the direction from which the enemy is expected to make his appearance. In this manner they help to support the points of the patrols and clear the way for them.
During combat the snipers take up positions from which they can actively further the development of the engagement. While the one selects moving targets, the other tries to put enemy gun nests out of action. After having made a personal reconnaissance of the local terrain, the snipers continually change position, thus deceiving the enemy as to their whereabouts.
At home in the snow: A Finnish sniper using a captured Soviet SVT-40 semi-automatic rifle with a 3.5X 22 mm PU scope. The SVT-40 was not a particularly good sniper rifle, struggling with significant accuracy issues at longer ranges. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
When breaking away from the enemy, the two snipers can be used together with automatic riflemen as security elements. Care has to be taken, however, in this case, to place the snipers somewhat apart, as automatic rifle fire will attract enemy fire.
(4) The Attack
For the attack, snipers are mainly employed to select such enemy targets as most impede the advance. Best results are obtained if they operate on the flank. Snipers are not only to be given clear instructions as to their own positions and tasks when advancing, but also should be familiarized with the plan and object of the unit.
In the attack, snipers concentrate especially upon eliminating enemy officers, men directing enemy fire, automatic riflemen and antitank personnel. Should they not succeed in silencing these objects, they indicate by tracers their position to friendly MGs, mortars or antitank guns, and move without delay to alternate positions.
Short-range sniper: Although not fitted with a scope, the Finnish Suomi 9 mm KP/31 was highly accurate for a submachine gun. Talented shooters using the highly-controllable Suomi were able to achieve hits at up to 300 meters. So, while not a sniper weapon, per se, the Finns found ways to use it effectively beyond normal SMG ranges. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
In case of counterattack by the enemy, the two snipers organize their activity as follows: one destroys enemy weapons, the other the man-power of the enemy, especially officers, automatic riflemen and sharpshooters. The activity of friendly shock troops is to be supported by two to four snipers. Well-placed hits in enemy fire slits enable the shock troops to force their way into enemy emplacements.
(5) The Defense
The firing positions of the snipers vary with situation and distance from the enemy. During an engagement snipers are placed in the outpost line or even moved further ahead. If the fight is carried on over a short distance only, they may be moved even behind the M.L.R. provided there are commanding hills or elevations.
b. Finnish Observations
This section details Finnish combat experience with Russian snipers.
(1) Enemy Organization
The main factors contributing to the effectiveness of enemy sniper activity are first: a good weapon (rifle with telescopic sight) and secondly, the concentrated use of snipers in as large numbers as possible. It is true that the sniper contingent of a rifle company consists only of 3 to 5 men (formerly only 2) but to this have to be added the sharpshooters sent forward in support by the rear formations. As these reserves take part in the struggle and put up a good fight to make a name for themselves, a great deal of their own glory goes to the snipers of the units in the line.
The Finnish M/39-43 sniper rifle fitted with a German Ajack 4×38 scope on Finnish-made mounts. About 500 Ajack scopes arrived in Finland in the winter of 1943/1944, and the resulting M/39-43 was the best Finnish sniping rifle of World War II. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
As far as number and position of the snipers are concerned there have not been any hard and fast rules. Recently snipers have usually worked in small groups (4 men); however, every man has his own post which he leaves within a given time to change over to another.
(2) Fixed Positions
The determining factors controlling sniper activity vary naturally from sector to sector, but generally it can be stated that the enemy very aptly takes advantage of local conditions and constantly keeps in mind that the secrecy of the sniper’s hideout is of utmost importance.
Usually the sniper takes his stand in a well-camouflaged dugout or other covered position connected with the trench. However, there are also cases where snipers have been observed in open positions.
The covered positions and dugouts are provided with one or several small fire slits. The face of the sniper cannot be seen, and in winter only the appearance of a small whirl of snow in front of the fire-slit betrays the fact that a shot has been fired.
The 4×38 Ajack scope mated to the Finnish M/39 rifle created the excellent M/39-43 sniping rifle. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
When operating from a dugout, the sniper aims sideways from the ordinary fire directions, probably to deceive the enemy or to provide cover for himself. In one instance snipers seem to have been posted in the background of the dugout or covered position firing through the openings of the front wall. This seems to be borne out by the fact that sometimes no sound of explosion was perceptible.
When posted in a trench the sniper observes through a very small, hard to-find, fire-slit in the parapet. Once in a while they have been seen posted in front of or behind the trench, even on top of the roofs of dugouts probably to secure a sufficient field of fire in low terrain. On moonlit nights snipers have been observed in no man’s land. Flares were then fired to illuminate the targets.
Houses and rubble furnish snipers with excellent hiding places, hatch openings in attics and cellars being used as fire apertures. Also by removing some bricks, slits for observation and firing have been created. Snipers have also hidden themselves in lumber stacks and wood piles. During the summer several snipers were shot out of trees. In winter, however, trees have been avoided by them.
Armored sniper shields were relatively common in the Finnish Army when in positional warfare. This marksman uses a captured Soviet SVT-40 semi-automatic rifle. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
The Russian snipers seem to execute their tasks with extraordinary patience and tenacity and seem to have excellent material at their disposal. This can be concluded from the fact that they were able to discern even the least movement at great distances and that they concentrated their efforts only upon well-selected, sure and visible targets. Generally speaking, they were interested only in sure targets. Also the cooperation between several snipers seems to be smooth and the allocation of the different phases of the work well-organized.
Cold trigger finger: A Finnish sniper using a captured Soviet M/91-30 sniper rifle (with PE scope). Note the gloved hand supporting the rifle, but a bare hand on the trigger. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
It seems that once in a while two snipers go after the same target, for it happened that two men walking side by side were hit almost at the same time. On another occasion, one of our {Finnish] snipers was taking aim at his opponent when another enemy sniper shot his rifle to pieces. The sniper’s mate not only takes care of the observation, but also the deception of the enemy. He tries by all conceivable means to lure lookouts and guards from their protective cover.
Enemy snipers have used “dum-dum” ammunition, which made it more difficult to locate the spot from which the shot was fired but easier for the enemy to observe a hit.
(3) Time of Activity
The activities of enemy snipers have been the liveliest on bright, sunny days, in winter after snowstorms when snowdrifts covered trenches and communication trenches. Also light snowfalls and dusk were selected by the enemy snipers to step up their activity, as then our men moved about somewhat more carelessly, but the enemy’s telescopic sights still offered a clear enough view to secure a hit. Our mealtimes, too, when again our men dropped some of their watchfulness, were utilized. In daytime, snipers generally preferred the mornings and noon-time.
(4) Ranges and Performances
Depending upon the distance between the lines, the ranges run from 100 to 900 yards, but occasionally enemy snipers have tried shots up to 1,400 yards. The usual and most effective distance is 200 to 400 yards, but even at 600 to 700 yards the accuracy of fire has been fairly satisfactory. The fire readiness and speed of fire have been good even on moving targets, a proof on the one hand of thorough training, and on the other of the indispensability of the telescopic sight.
The speed and accuracy of fire gave rise to the suspicion that snipers posted in buildings made use of special aids. The accuracy of the fire may be illustrated by the following examples:
At 200 to 400 yards several scissors telescopes and periscopes were smashed to pieces. One sniper shot down a small rock which had been placed in an observation slit three times in rapid succession.
The enemy sniper: A Soviet sniper with a M91/30 sniper rifle equipped with PE scope. Photo courtesy of author’s collection.
When one of our MG platoon commanders lifted his hand just once above the snow-wall to repair the alarm wire a Russian sniper scored a hit on his hand at 100 yards. A sniper was hit several times through an observation slit fashioned into the snow-wall with a stick. Various objects lifted by our men above the parapet, as a trial, were generally hit. It also happened that Finnish observers behind periscopes, were shot at through the snow wall.
(5) Deception
Enemy snipers made use, among others, of the following methods of deception: In order to induce our men to become lax in their watchfulness they leave a position in our line alone for as many as 8 days.
Soviet sniper with M91/30 PU sniper rifle. Photo courtesy of author’s collection.
The sniper’s mate shovels snow from a pit for a while then raises a helmet above the parapet, or a sniper puts a helmet visibly into a fire slit and then opens fire from an alternate position. One sniper takes up position behind a rock, then the other moves a completely equipped dummy back and forth in the trench. By opening heavy fire in a certain sector the enemy tries to confuse our men and cause them to expose themselves. Long bursts of automatic weapon fire have been used for the same purpose.
c. Finnish Counter-Measures
Most of the losses from enemy sniper fire have been caused by carelessness, inept utilization of cover and concealment, use of dirty snow capes and caps, or by not wearing any suitable garment at all that would afford protection against detection in a given terrain.
These losses are a proven fact, and soldiers must be forced to do every thing in their power to impede the activities of snipers.
The following counter-measures may be used among others:
(1) Careful movements and the taking of full advantage of the ground in the danger zone;
(2) The best of camouflage;
(3) Sufficient depth of trenches and appropriate danger signs in the trenches;
(4) Struts placed across the trenches to force the men to walk in a bent body position;
(5) Use of snow capes;
(6) Use of clean and complete snow suits in the front line;
(7) Careful selection of the fire positions and their thorough reinforcement
(steel plates, sandbags) and camouflage;
(8) Frequent changing of observation points;
(9) Avoiding of unnecessary firing from observation posts and application of various proven methods of deception;
(10) Intensification of our own sniper activity by the use, for instance, of additional snipers from the reserve troops;
(11) Freeing snipers from other duties and continuing their training, especially with a view to improving their accuracy of fire;
(12) Organized use of other weapons against snipers who cannot be eliminated by our own snipers.
Winter Is Coming
“From now on the arctic region is accessible to man in both war and peace.”
Sniping in the Winter War, early 1940: Finland’s culture of marksmanship and field craft gave them a man-for-man advantage in a defensive war in the frozen north. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
Today, the Arctic remains frozen and foreboding to many. Even so, it is a land of many natural resources and territory that is increasingly coveted by leading global powers. The following comment from “Warfare in the Far North” (U.S. Army translation of German documents, the German Report Series, produced in 1951) seems to foretell of a new age for the Arctic, one filled with both positive and negative polarities.
Simo Häyhä used a Finnish-made M/28-30 rifle with standard sights to achieve a massive harvest of Russian invaders during the 1939-1940 Winter War. Photo courtesy of Finnish Wartime Photographic Archive, SA-kuva.
“The last Finnish war introduced a new chapter in the history of the earth. From now on the arctic region is accessible to man in both war and peace. The events of the wars in the Far North proved that even large numbers of men are able to live, work, and fight in the desolate regions north of the Arctic Circle. Modern technical science has provided the means for overcoming difficulties of climate and terrain in the frigid zone and has even made life tolerable there. The man of the 20th century has the means of pushing into the arctic region in rather large numbers, establishing healthy homes and places to work, and preserving the creative impulses and the joy of life of the pioneers in the Far North.”
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