Countering Drones – Part 1, by TacOps

Drones are a hot topic in the news. From drones flying over New Jersey, Coast Guard ships, and other areas, to drone use in Ukraine, these have concerned many people. From the perspective of many in the prepping community, the question is how to prepare for drone attacks in a TEOTWAWKI situation. In this article, I will highlight a brief history of drone use, a background on the overall situation concerning contemporary events with drones, current anti-drone applications, and how to ultimately prepare to counter-drone reconnaissance and/or direct attacks.

A Brief History of Drones

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s), now commonly referred to as drones, are defined as aircraft that do not contain an on-board pilot or crew. They were originally developed during the First World War as a means of delivering high amounts of explosives more accurately than high-flying bombers or generally inaccurate artillery. Britain developed the Aerial Target in 1917, and the United States developed the Kettering Bug in 1918. The Aerial Target was a radio-controlled aircraft packed with explosives; the Kettering Bug was an aerial torpedo, which was the precursor for the modern-day cruise missile. Due to the high cost per use, neither country deployed these weapons operationally during the First World War.

During the Second World War, nations learned to prioritize airpower as a means of projecting power forward. The ability to bomb enemy forces or munitions factories, parachute battalion-size formations, or deploy equipment and resupplies to cut-off units changed the face of warfare. Reflecting this gained knowledge, major powers attempted to train fighter pilots and anti-aircraft crews during the Cold War against unmanned flying targets – drones. These targets, such as the DH.82B Queen Bee, were full-size aircraft that mirrored the shape and color of German aircraft, as they prepared for a Third World War.

Drones were first used on a large scale during warfare in the Vietnam War. The U.S. Air Force lost nearly 40% of its F-105 Thunderchief fleet in Vietnam. Looking for a relatively inexpensive way to continue gaining air superiority, the Air Force turned to drones. Drones began as aerial decoys; when senior officers saw their usefulness, they then employed drones as reconnaissance assets and to drop leaflets as part of psychological warfare.

Around the same time, the Israeli Air Force used drones extensively during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Here, senior Officers used drones to identify Syrian surface-to-air weapon locations by ‘fingerprinting’ their sensors, then jam them by emitting false aircraft signatures as a means of electronic ‘recon by fire.’ This allowed Israel to destroy nearly 90% of Syrian anti-air assets, guaranteeing Israeli air superiority during the ensuing ground conflict. Israel successfully employed drones, with similar results, during Operation Peace for Galilee in 1983.
During the Global War on Terror, the United States and its NATO allies extensively used drones to track high-value targets for long periods of time and reconnoiter targets before strikes. They became smaller and able to refuel in the air, thus extending their usefulness to senior-level leaders. Policy-makers began using them to deliver missile payloads for both the Armed Forces and various intelligence agencies. While they were significantly less risky for allied lives, it became very easy for senior-level leaders to sign off on and deploy drones, with fatal consequences. Therefore, a whole stream of morality and philosophy concerning lethal and non-lethal use of drones developed.

Conversely, ISIS began using drones to reconnoiter and target allied vehicles and personnel. Drones would drop a grenade or IED above a military vehicle. When vehicles began maneuvering to evade these drones, ISIS began employing suicide drones with an explosive payload to chase after the target. ISIS leaders would lose the drones, but they were easily replaceable. Therefore, we see how inexpensive drones have changed tactics on the battlefield.

This was again apparent during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Here, Azerbaijan successfully used drones to target and destroy both light and mechanized formations in its war against Armenia. Organizations began referring to Azerbaijani success with drones as a ‘more affordable type of airpower.’ This was mistakenly heralded as the death of armor, and many theorists believed that tanks had become obsolete. While we now know that armored assets are still vital on the modern battlefield, they are vulnerable to swarms of drones in both open terrain and urban environments.

Contemporary Background

The Ukraine-Russia War is the first true drone war. Both sides are heavily using drones to reconnoiter, strike, deliver small resupplies, and observe for artillery strikes. This has dramatically changed the way that militaries fight on the modern battlefield.

Patrols are targets for drones with explosive payloads. This is especially true when Soldiers walk in column formations on roads or are ignoring proper spacing. Suicide drones have targeted open-faced or soft-sided trucks numerous times. Consequently, patrols are now smaller and move quicker in open terrain. Some patrols are just a single rifle squad of approximately ten Soldiers. Others consist of a tank and armored personnel carrier carrying a dismounted rifle squad. These smaller patrols offer more flexibility to military operations while still allowing for a larger quick reaction force to deploy towards the point of contact. Notably, both Russian and Ukrainian forces still make ground assaults as Battalion-level units or higher.

Tactical operations centers (TOCs) have dramatically changed their tactics, techniques, and procedures as well. TOCs served as the leadership hub for units, containing all the senior leadership and staff sections in a Battalion or higher formation. They were large and expanded throughout the Global War on Terror as commanders needed access to information more often and quicker than previous missions. Consequently, they did not move very often. Their greatest dangers were being discovered by enemy scouts. As long as the TOC was situated well behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and the unit had a good set of scouts, the TOC was unlikely to be discovered.

With the increasing use of drones, this risk has changed. TOCs, with their command tents, generators, CBRN equipment, radio antennas, and vehicles parked together to set up white boards, maps, and graphics, were highly visible to a low-flying drone. In addition, they emitted massive electronic and thermal signatures. This setup is a liability in today’s world of constant drone use. TOCs have been targeted numerous times in the Ukraine-Russia War. As a result, TOCs of the past are trimming the fat, becoming mobile command posts (CPs) that can still serve their necessary functions while minimizing the risk to the central hub of a unit. CPs now throw camouflage nets over their vehicles while stationary. The equipment set up is minimal – maps, a few graphics, and the bare essentials for intelligence, protection, and artillery warfighting functions to conduct their analysis. This has resulted in a dramatically less visible, thermal, or electronic signature.

Perhaps most importantly, drones have targeted logistical routes with devastating effectiveness. Trains, trucks, and other traditional ways of delivering supplies of food, water, fuel, and ammunition are more vulnerable than ever before. Drones are able to easily identify these high payoff targets and target them either with munitions or artillery. As a result, many of these resupply convoys have become smaller. As they move closer to the FLOT, these convoys become smaller and more maneuverable. Some light units have taken to sending a dismounted squad to go pick up small resupplies of food, water, fuel, and ammunition – and to carry it back to the main company area on foot. While this approach takes a small amount of troops out of the fight, it also reduces the risk of being discovered by drones and having your supplies destroyed.

Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) has also changed. During the United States’ Global War on Terror, MEDEVAC oriented around the “golden hour.” This referred to the high likelihood of a wounded Soldier’s survival if he or she could get to a medical provider within one hour of injury. This relied heavily on the American military’s air superiority – allowing for MEDEVAC helicopters to fly in and quickly transport wounded Soldiers back to a field hospital. Due to drone usage, this cannot be an assumption for future wars. It is much easier to achieve air superiority when only fighter jets, bombers, and helicopters are using the airspace; cheap and readily available drones in the air means that it is nearly impossible to achieve true air superiority. This has resulted in Soldiers in Ukraine having to wait a significant time to get evacuated. Sometimes, this is until nightfall; sometimes, the wait time can be up to 72 hours. The United States military, preparing for a large-scale conflict, has opted to move its MEDEVAC window from a “golden hour” to a “golden window of opportunity,” leaving a very generic set of expectations for how soon soldiers can expect medical intervention.

The contemporary context surrounding today’s use of drones is not just limited to the military. As drone technology advanced, they became less expensive to build and maintain. As such, civilian organizations started using them to track weather, take pictures of real estate, and to track cattle. Companies used them more often to enhance their ability to do standard tasks. Individuals began buying them for recreational and business use. Conversely, criminals started using them to reconnoiter trafficking routes or to stalk potential victims.

The first government intervention began after individuals began using them for pest removal. Attaching a flamethrower to a drone-enabled individuals to quickly and safely remove wasp nests in rural areas. However, this dramatically increased the risk for wildfires. Some individuals attached fireworks to their drones, launching them over the water – or, in some documented cases, at neighbors who were having loud parties. Thus, the FAA began regulating what items individuals can or cannot install on their drones. Flamethrowers, fireworks, firearms, and explosives are generally restricted.

Legislation on drones is still emerging. The most significant piece of legislation restricts where drones can fly. Like traditional aircraft, drones cannot fly over restricted airspace, such as airports or military bases. Private citizens and corporations cannot legally shoot down or jam drones. This extends to both kinetic and non-kinetic means. This is a Federal law with some severe consequences.  The law now essentially treats drones like manned aircraft, and shooting one down could be prosecuted as a Federal felony.

(To be concluded tomorrow, in Part 2.)