The following is just a brief summary of some legal terminology. A serious legal scholar would do a deep dive and end up with a 50,000-word treatise. But that is not my intent here, so I will keep it brief:
One book that I’ve often referred to over the years is Black’s Law Dictionary. Mine is a 6th Edition, printed in 1991. I also have an e-book copy of the classic Bouvier’s Law Dictionary from 1856. It is interesting to see how some definitions of terms have morphed, over time.
People often use the terms Freedom and Liberty synonymously. However, to taxonomists, freedom is an expansive, all-encompassing term, whereas liberty is a more restrictive and limited term. In essence, Freedom is the ability to act however one chooses, whereas Liberty describes a release or emancipation from slavery or governmental control. I like to think of the disparity this way: Freedom is something that you’re supposed to have, while Liberty is something that you actually have. Or, another way of looking at it is that Freedom is God-given, but Liberty can be either government-granted or it can be seized, (individually or by groups) to restore freedom.
An Aside: For countless centuries the Phrygian Cap or Liberty Cap (as illustrated at the top of this article) has symbolized a man’s release from slavery. From the Infogalactic Wiki:
“The Phrygian cap, also known as Thracian cap and liberty cap, is a soft conical cap with the apex bent over, associated in antiquity with several peoples in Eastern Europe, Anatolia, and Asia. The Phrygian cap was worn by Thracians, Dacians, Persians, Medes, Scythians, Trojans, and Phrygians after whom it is named. The oldest known depiction of the Phrygian cap is from Persepolis in Iran.
Although Phrygian caps did not originally function as liberty caps, they came to signify freedom and the pursuit of liberty first in the American Revolution and then in the French Revolution, particularly as a symbol of Jacobinism (in which context it has been also called a Jacobin cap). The original cap of liberty was the Roman pileus, the felt cap of emancipated slaves of ancient Rome, which was an attribute of Libertas, the Roman goddess of liberty. In the 16th century, the Roman iconography of liberty was revived in emblem books and numismatic handbooks where the figure of Libertas is usually depicted with a pileus. The most extensive use of headgear as a modern symbol of freedom in the first two centuries after the revival of Roman iconography was made in the Netherlands, where it became popular headdress. In the 18th century, the traditional liberty cap was widely used in English prints, and from 1789 also in French prints; by the early 1790s, it was regularly used in the Phrygian form.”
The legal definitions of Liberty and Freedom are less disparate than the definitions described by taxonomists and semanticists. The following is an excerpt from Black’s:
“FREEDOM, Liberty; the right to do what is not forbidden by law. Freedom does not preclude the idea of subjection to law; indeed, it presupposes the existence of some legislative provision, the observance of which insures freedom to us, by securing the like observance from others. 2 Har. Cond. L. R. 208.”
The modern editions of Black’s very closely defines Liberty as: “Freedom from all restraints except such as are justly imposed by law.”
But if we jump back 17 decades… Bouvier’s (1856) definition of Liberty is more broad, all-encompassing, and exclusive of governmental meddling:
“LIBERTY. Freedom from restraint. The power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, except from the laws of nature.
2. Liberty is divided into civil, natural, personal, and political.
3. Civil liberty is the power to do whatever is permitted by the constitution of the state and the laws of the land. It is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws, and no further, operating equally upon all the citizens, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. 1 Black. Com. 125; Paley’s Mor. Phil. B. 6, c.5; Swifts Syst. 12
4. That system of laws is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the citizen entirely master of his own conduct, except in those points in which the public good requires some direction and restraint. When a man is restrained in his natural liberty by no municipal laws but those which are requisite to prevent his violating the natural law, and to promote the greatest moral and physical welfare of the community, he is legally possessed of the fullest enjoyment of his civil rights of individual liberty. But it must not be inferred that individuals are to judge for themselves how far the law may justifiably restrict their individual liberty; for it is necessary to the welfare of the commonwealth, that the law should be obeyed; and thence is derived the legal maxim, that no man may be wiser than the law.
5. Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind, of diposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature, and that they do not in any way abuse it to the prejudice of other men. Burlamaqui, c. 3, s. 15; 1 Bl. Com. 125.
6. Personal liberty is the independence of our actions of all other will than our own. Wolff, Ins. Nat. §77. It consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. 1 Bl. Com. 134.
7. Political liberty may be defined to be, the security by which, from the constitution, form and nature of the established government, the citizens enjoy civil liberty. No ideas or definitions are more distinguishable than those of civil aud political liberty, yet they are generally confounded. 1 Bl. Com. 6, 125. The political liberty of a state is based upon those fundamental laws which establish the distribution of legislative and executive powers. The political liberty of a citizen is that tranquillity of mind, which is the effect of an opinion that he is in perfect security; and to insure this security, the government must be such that one citizen shall not fear another.
8. In the English law, by liberty is meant a privilege held by grant or prescription, by which some men enjoy greater benefits than ordinary subjects. A liberty is also a territory, with some extraordinary privilege.
9. By liberty or liberties, is understood a part of a town or city, as the Northern Liberties of the city of Philadelphia. The same as Faubourg. (q. V.)”
Defining License
Black’s (1980) defines a license as:
“LICENSE. In the law of contracts. A permission, accorded by a competent authority, conferring the right to do some act which without such authorization would be illegal, or would be a trespass or a tort. State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 220; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 054; Hubman v. State, 61 Ark. 4S2. 33 S. W. 843; Chicago v. Collins, 175 111. 445. 51 N. E. 907, 49 L. R. A. 40S, 67 L. R. A. 224. Also the written evidence of such permission.”
Back Before Licenses
Before the U.S. Civil War, “licenses” were only seen as spoken or written contracts and primarily between private parties, not between governments and citizens. It is interesting to note that the modern concept of a license (such as a driver’s license, hunting license, or even a marriage license) as issued by a government agency was essentially unknown to Americans in the 1850s. One of the few exceptions in that era was a “tavern” license, which was analogous to a modern Liquor License. But those were mostly issued locally, because drinking outside of a private home was seen as sinful and immoral, and local governments wanted to minimize such behavior.
From Bouvier’s (1856) :
“LICENSE, contracts. A right given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal. The instrument or writing which secures this right, is also called a license. Vide Ayl. Parerg, 353; 15 Vin. Ab. 92; Ang. Wat. Co. 61, 85. 2. A license is express or implied. An express license is one which in direct terms authorizes the performance of a certain act; as a license to keep a tavern given by public authority. 3. An implied license is one which though not expressly given, may be presumed from the acts of the party having a right to give it. The following are examples of such licenses: 1. When a man knocks at another’s door, and it is opened, the act of opening the door licenses the former to enter the house for any lawful purpose. See Hob. 62. A servant is, in consequence of his employment, licensed to admit to the house, those who come on his master’s business, but only such persons. Selw. N. P. 999; Cro. Eliz. 246. It may, however, be inferred from circumstances that the servant has authority to invite whom he pleases to the house, for lawful purposes. See 2 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 427; Entry. 4. A license is either a bare authority, without interest, or it is coupled with an interest. 1. A bare license must be executed by the party to whom it is given in person, and cannot be made over or assigned by him to another; and, being without consideration, may be revoked at pleasure, as long as it remains executory; 39 Hen. VI. M. 12, page 7; but when carried into effect, either partially or altogether, it can only be rescinded, if in its nature it will admit of revocation, by placing the other side in the same situation in which he stood before he entered on its execution. 8 East, R. 308; Palm. 71; S. C. Poph. 151; S. C. 2 Roll. Rep. 143, 152. 5.-2. When the license is coupled with an interest the authority conferred is not properly a mere permission, but amounts to a grant, which cannot be revoked, and it may then be assigned to a third person. 5 Hen. V., M. 1, page 1; 2 Mod. 317; 7 Bing. 693; 8 East, 309; 5 B. & C. 221; 7 D. & R. 783; Crabb on R. P. Sec. 521 to 525; 14 S. & R 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 522. When the license is coupled with an interest, the formalities essential to confer such interest should be observed. Say. R. 3; 6 East, R. 602; 8 East, R. 310, note. See 14 S. & R. 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 522; 11 Ad. & El. 34, 39; S. C. 39 Eng, C. L. R. 19
I will add my own clarifying definition: A “license” in the modern sense is a permission document granted by a governmental agency in a standardized form, usually for a fee, to do something that would otherwise be illegal. Ponder that.
Another Aside: I find it noteworthy that the ubiquitous Driver’s License has become the preferred Document of Demand for the modern Police State. 21st-Century police are always asking for “ID” and your Driver’s License is what they expect to be handed, in all circumstances –even when you are not driving. This all-too-frequent demand is not Constitutional in typical street encounters with the gendarmes. See: Terry v. Ohio. Unless police officers have at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion of an actual crime in a Terry stop or probable cause (incident to an arrest) then they cannot demand your identification!
Without a doubt, our identity documents are “papers” as mentioned in the Fourth Amendment:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Privileges versus rights
Next, I’d like to distinguish between privileges and rights.
From Bouvier’s:
PRIVILEGE, rights. This word, taken its active sense, is a particular law, or a particular disposition of the law, which grants certain special prerogatives to some persons, contrary to common right. In its passive sense, it is the same prerogative granted by the same particular law.
2. Examples of privilege may be found in all systems of law; members of congress and of the several legislatures, during a certain time, parties and witnesses while attending court; and coming to and returning from the same; electors, while going to the election, remaining on the ground, or returning from the same, are all privileged from arrest, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace.
3. Privileges from arrest for civil cases are either general and absolute, or limited and qualified as to time or place.
4. – 1. In the first class may be mentioned ambassadors, and their servants, when the debt or duty has been contracted by the latter since they entered into the service of such ambassador; insolvent debtors duly discharged under the insolvent laws; in some places, as in Pennsylvania, women for any debt by them contracted; and in general, executors and administrators, when sued in their representative character, though they have been held to bail. 2 Binn. 440.
5. – 2. In the latter class may be placed, 1st. Members of congress this privilege is strictly personal, and is not only his own, or that of his constituent, but also that of the house of which he is a member, which every man is bound to know, and must take notice of. Jeff. Man. 3; 2 Wils. R. 151; Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17. The time during which the privilege extends includes all the period of the session of congress, and a reasonable time for going to, and returning from the seat of government. Jeff. Man. 3; Story, Const. 856 to 862; 1 Kent, Com. 221; 1 Dall. R. 296. The same privilege is extended to the members of the different state legislatures.
6. – 2d. Electors under the constitution and laws of the United States, or of any state, are protected from arrest for any civil cause, or for any crime except treason, felony, or a breach of the peace, eundo, morando, et redeundo, that is, going to, staying at, or returning from the election.
7. – 3d. Militia men, while engaged in the performance of military duty, under the laws, and eundo, morando et redeundo.
8. – 4th. All persons who, either necessarily or of right are attending any court or forum of justice, whether as judge, juror, party interested or witness, and eundo, morando et redeundo. See 6 Mass. R, 245; 4 Dall. R. 329, 487; 2 John. R. 294; 1 South. R. 366; 11 Mass. R. 11; 3 Cowen, R. 381; 1 Pet. C. C. R. 41.
9. Ambassadors are wholly exempt from arrest for civil or criminal cases. Vide Ambassador. See, generally, Bac. Ab. h. t.; 2 Rolle’s Ab. 272; 2 Lilly’s Reg. 369; Brownl. 15; 13 Mass. R. 288; 1 Binn. R. 77; 1 H. Bl. 686; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.”
Also from Bouvier’s:
“RIGHT. This word is used in various senses: 1. Sometimes it signifies a law, as when we say that natural right requires us to keep our promises, or that it commands restitution, or that it forbids murder. In our language it is seldom used in this sense. 2. It sometimes means that quality in our actions by which they are denominated just ones. This is usually denominated rectitude. 3. It is that quality in a person by which he can do certain actions, or possess certain things which belong to him by virtue of some title. In this sense, we use it when we say that a man has a right to his estate or a right to defend himself. Ruth, Inst. c. 2, §1, 2, 3; Merlin,; Repert. de Jurisp. mot Droit. See Wood’s Inst. 119.
2. In this latter sense alone, will this word be here considered. Right is the correlative of duty, for, wherever one has a right due to him, some other must owe him a duty. 1 Toull. n. 96.
3. Rights are perfect and imperfect. When the things which we have a right to possess or the actions we have a right to do, are or may be fixed and determinate, the right is a perfect one; but when the thing or the actions are vague and indeterminate, the right is an imperfect one. If a man demand his property, which is withheld from him, the right that supports his demand is a perfect one; because the thing demanded is, or may be fixed and determinate.
4. But if a poor man ask relief from those from whom he has reason to expect it, the right, which supports his petition, is an imperfect one; because the relief which he expects, is a vague indeterminate, thing. Ruth. Inst. c. 2, §4; Grot. lib. 1, c. §4.
5. Rights are also absolute and qualified. A man has an absolute right to recover property which belongs to him; an agent has a qualified right to recover such property, when it had been entrusted to his care, and which has been unlawfully taken out of his possession. Vide Trover.
6. Rights might with propriety be also divided into natural and civil rights but as all the rights which man has received from nature have been modified and acquired anew from the civil law, it is more proper, when considering their object, to divide them into political and civil rights.
7. Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or management of government. These political rights are fixed by the constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of being elected; these are the political rights which the humblest citizen possesses.
8. Civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government. These consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying property, of exercising the paternal and marital powers, and the like. It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by a sentence of civil death, is in the enjoyment of his civil rights, which is not the case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no political, although in the full enjoyment of his civil rights.
9. These latter rights are divided into absolute and relative. The absolute rights of mankind may be reduced to three principal or primary articles: the right of personal security, which consists in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation; the right of personal liberty, which consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s inclination may direct, without any restraint, unless by due course of law; the right of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. 1 Bl. 124 to 139.
10. The relative rights are public or private: the first are those which subsist between the people and the government, as the right of protection on the part of the people, and the right of allegiance which is due by the people to the government; the second are the reciprocal rights of hushand and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, aud master and servant.
11. Rights are also divided into legal and equitable. The former are those where the party has the legal title to a thing, and in that case, his remedy for an infringement of it, is by an action in a court of law. Although the person holding the legal title may have no actual interest, but hold only as trustee, the suit must be in his name, and not in general, in that of the cestui que trust. 1 East, 497 8 T. R. 332; 1 Saund. 158, n. 1; 2 Bing. 20. The latter, or equitable rights, are those which may be enforced in a court of equity by the cestui que trust. See, generally, Bouv. Ins t. Index, h. t. Remedy.”
Our Rights Trump All Privileges
Properly, our rights are an umbrella far and above higher than mere privileges. Our rights are bestowed by God. But civil governments like to think that they can usurp our rights by doling out privileges, permits, and licenses. Failure to buy their corporate licenses will land someone in jail, or even prison. If I were to travel back in time and try to explain to one of our Founding Fathers that a barber or hairdresser in 2025 needs to pay an annual fee to the government for a license to cut hair, they would be flabbergasted.
One Last Aside: I live in a very lightly populated region in the Inland Northwest. Our little ranch is almost surrounded by millions of acres of National Forest. That makes the Federal Government my next-door neighbor. Living like we do can put things in sharp contrast. For example, each year I am expected to visit the Forest Service Office to Ask Permission to cut down a few dead-standing frees on road-accessible public land for heating stove firewood. They Issue a Permit, for this privilege. Although the permits are free, the fact that I have to go and annually ask “Mother, May I”, deeply irks me.
Conclusion
Words have meanings. Politicians often attempt to encroach on our freedom, by attempting to redefine words. (For some details on this, see my 2013 SurvivalBlog essay: Incendiary Words: Of Detonations and Denotations.)
As I’ve written before: Hold fast to the true meaning of words and phrases, or we are doomed. – J.W.R.
P.S.: I hope that this has inspired you to study more about legal terms. For some further reading, I suggest that you dig into the definitions of malum prohibutum versus mala in se. The difference between these two terms is huge, with some profound implications. The common law, which is based on God’s law, centers on mala in se crimes, but modern statutory jurisdiction is all about malum prohibutum.
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